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ID

VDE-2019-005

Published

2019-03-19 16:34 (CET)

Last update

2019-03-19 16:34 (CET)

Vendor(s)

Endress+Hauser AG

Product(s)

Article No° Product Name Affected Version(s)
Field Xpert SFX350 <= current version
Field Xpert SFX370 <= current version
Field Xpert SMT70 <= current version

Summary

Multiple security issues and vulnerabilities within the WPA2 standard have been identified and publicized by Mr. Mathy Vanhoef of KU Leuven. These vulnerabilities may allow the reinstallation of a pairwise transient key, a group key, or an integrity key on either a wireless client or a wireless access point (AP). In consequence, an attacker could establish a man-in-the-middle position between AP and client facilitating packet decryption and injection.

The Field Xpert SFX370 and SFX350 handhelds are manufactured by Pepperl+Fuchs/ecom instruments for Endress+Hauser.

The Advisory for Pepperl+Fuchs/ecom instruments can be found here: VDE-2017-005

Vulnerabilities



Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 9:59 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11r allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the fast BSS transmission (FT) handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 10 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peer Key (TPK) during the TDLS handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Last Update
Sept. 20, 2019, 9:42 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 9:58 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 9:59 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 10 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 10 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Last Update
Sept. 20, 2019, 9:42 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Last Update
Sept. 20, 2019, 9:43 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.

Impact

The devices are in theory attackable by replay, decryption and faking of packets. However, to perform the attack, the attacker must be significantly closer to the ecom device than to the access point. The WPA2 password cannot be compromised using a KRACK attack. Note if WPA-TKIP is used instead of AES-CCMP, an attacker can easily fake and inject packets directly into the WIFI.

Solution

For Field Xpert handheld devices (SFX350/SFX370) running Windows Mobile, Endress+Hauser recommends to apply the security updates provided by Microsoft.

Intermec/Honeywell as producer of the basis of the handheld provide the following security patch for the Windows Mobile operating system: SR18012500_802T_Cx70_WM65_ALL.CAB

To obtain this patch, please contact your local Endress+Hauser representative.

If you are using WPA-TKIP in your WLAN, you should switch to AES-CCMP immediately.

For Field Xpert tablet PC for device configuration (SMT70) running Windows 10 Pro 1703 64 EN, Endress+Hauser strongly recommends updating to the newest available Windows version.



As a general security measure Endress+Hauser strongly recommends to protect network access to the WIFI network with appropriate mechanisms. It is advised to configure the environment in order to run the devices in a protected IT environment.


Note: This advisory will be updated as further details and/or software updates become available.

Reported by

Mathy Vanhoef of imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven published this vulnerability on https://www.krackattacks.com.

ENDRESS+HAUSER reported this vulnerability to CERT@VDE.