Original release date: June 30, 2022SummaryActions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:
• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
• Enable and enforce multifactor authentication.
Note: this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of the Treasury, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) are releasing this CSA to provide information on MedusaLocker ransomware. Observed as recently as May 2022, MedusaLocker actors predominantly rely on vulnerabilities in Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to access victims’ networks. The MedusaLocker actors encrypt the victim's data and leave a ransom note with communication instructions in every folder containing an encrypted file. The note directs victims to provide ransomware payments to a specific Bitcoin wallet address. MedusaLocker appears to operate as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model based on the observed split of ransom payments. Typical RaaS models involve the ransomware developer and various affiliates that deploy the ransomware on victim systems. MedusaLocker ransomware payments appear to be consistently split between the affiliate, who receives 55 to 60 percent of the ransom; and the developer, who receives the remainder. 
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 633 kb
Technical DetailsMedusaLocker ransomware actors most often gain access to victim devices through vulnerable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configurations [T1133]. Actors also frequently use email phishing and spam email campaigns—directly attaching the ransomware to the email—as initial intrusion vectors [T1566].
MedusaLocker ransomware uses a batch file to execute PowerShell script invoke-ReflectivePEInjection [T1059.001]. This script propagates MedusaLocker throughout the network by editing the EnableLinkedConnections value within the infected machine’s registry, which then allows the infected machine to detect attached hosts and networks via Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and to detect shared storage via Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol. 
MedusaLocker then: 

Restarts the LanmanWorkstation service, which allows registry edits to take effect. 
Kills the processes of well-known security, accounting, and forensic software. 
Restarts the machine in safe mode to avoid detection by security software [T1562.009].
Encrypts victim files with the AES-256 encryption algorithm; the resulting key is then encrypted with an RSA-2048 public key [T1486]. 
Runs every 60 seconds, encrypting all files except those critical to the functionality of the victim’s machine and those that have the designated encrypted file extension. 
Establishes persistence by copying an executable (svhost.exe or svhostt.exe) to the %APPDATA%\Roaming directory and scheduling a task to run the ransomware every 15 minutes. 
Attempts to prevent standard recovery techniques by deleting local backups, disabling startup recovery options, and deleting shadow copies [T1490].

MedusaLocker actors place a ransom note into every folder containing a file with the victim's encrypted data. The note outlines how to communicate with the MedusaLocker actors, typically providing victims one or more email address at which the actors can be reached. The size of MedusaLocker ransom demands appears to vary depending on the victim’s financial status as perceived by the actors. 
 
Indicators of Compromise



Encrypted File Extensions




.1btc
.matlock20
.marlock02
.readinstructions


.bec
.mylock
.jpz.nz
.marlock11


.cn
.NET1
.key1
.fileslocked


.datalock
.NZ
.lock
.lockfilesUS


.deadfilesgr
.tyco
.lockdata7
.rs


.faratak
.uslockhh
.lockfiles
.tyco


.fileslock
.zoomzoom
.perfection
.uslockhh


.marlock13
n.exe
.Readinstruction
.marlock08


.marlock25
nt_lock20
.READINSTRUCTION
 


.marlock6
.marlock01
.ReadInstructions
 



 



Ransom Note File Names




how_to_ recover_data.html 
how_to_recover_data.html.marlock01


instructions.html 
READINSTRUCTION.html 


!!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!!
How_to_recovery.txt


readinstructions.html 
readme_to_recover_files


recovery_instructions.html 
HOW_TO_RECOVER_DATA.html


recovery_instruction.html
 



 



Payment Wallets




14oxnsSc1LZ5M2cPZeQ9rFnXqEvPCnZikc 


1DRxUFhvJjGUdojCzMWSLmwx7Qxn79XbJq 


18wRbb94CjyTGkUp32ZM7krCYCB9MXUq42 


1AbRxRfP6yHePpi7jmDZkS4Mfpm1ZiatH5


1Edcufenw1BB4ni9UadJpQh9LVx9JGtKpP


1DyMbw6R9PbJqfUSDcK5729xQ57yJrE8BC 


184ZcAoxkvimvVZaj8jZFujC7EwR3BKWvf 


14oH2h12LvQ7BYBufcrY5vfKoCq2hTPoev


bc1qy34v0zv6wu0cugea5xjlxagsfwgunwkzc0xcjj


bc1q9jg45a039tn83jk2vhdpranty2y8tnpnrk9k5q


bc1qz3lmcw4k58n79wpzm550r5pkzxc2h8rwmmu6xm


1AereQUh8yjNPs9Wzeg1Le47dsqC8NNaNM


1DeNHM2eTqHp5AszTsUiS4WDHWkGc5UxHf


1HEDP3c3zPwiqUaYuWZ8gBFdAQQSa6sMGw


1HdgQM9bjX7u7vWJnfErY4MWGBQJi5mVWV


1nycdn9ebxht4tpspu4ehpjz9ghxlzipll


12xd6KrWVtgHEJHKPEfXwMVWuFK4k1FCUF


1HZHhdJ6VdwBLCFhdu7kDVZN9pb3BWeUED


1PormUgPR72yv2FRKSVY27U4ekWMKobWjg


14cATAzXwD7CQf35n8Ea5pKJPfhM6jEHak


1PopeZ4LNLanisswLndAJB1QntTF8hpLsD



 



Email Addresses




willyhill1960@tutanota[.]com 
unlockfile@cock[.]li


zlo@keem[.]ne 
unlockmeplease@airmail[.]cc 


zlo@keemail[.]me 
unlockmeplease@protonmail[.]com 


zlo@tfwno[.]gf 
willyhill1960@protonmail[.]com 


support@ypsotecs[.]com
support@imfoodst[.]com 



 



Email Addresses




traceytevin@protonmail[.]com 
support@itwgset[.]com


unlock_file@aol[.]com 
support@novibmaker[.]com


unlock_file@outlook[.]com 
support@securycasts[.]com 


support@exoprints[.]com
rewmiller-1974@protonmail[.]com


support@exorints[.]com 
rpd@keemail[.]me


support@fanbridges[.]com 
soterissylla@wyseil[.]com 


support@faneridges[.]com
support@careersill[.]com 


perfection@bestkoronavirus[.]com 
karloskolorado@tutanota[.]com


pool1256@tutanota[.]com 
kevynchaz@protonmail[.]com 


rapid@aaathats3as[.]com
korona@bestkoronavirus[.]com


rescuer@tutanota[.]com
lockPerfection@gmail[.]com


ithelp01@decorous[.]cyou
lockperfection@gmail[.]com 


ithelp01@wholeness[.]business
mulierfagus@rdhos[.]com


ithelp02@decorous[.]cyou
[rescuer]@cock[.]li 


ithelp02@wholness[.]business
107btc@protonmail[.]com 


ithelpresotre@outlook[.]com
33btc@protonmail[.]com 


cmd@jitjat[.]org 
777decoder777@protonmail[.]com


coronaviryz@gmail[.]com
777decoder777@tfwno[.]gf


dec_helper@dremno[.]com
andrewmiller-1974@protonmail[.]com


dec_helper@excic[.]com 
angelomartin-1980@protonmail[.]com


dec_restore@prontonmail[.]com 
ballioverus@quocor[.]com


dec_restore1@outlook[.]com
beacon@jitjat[.]org


bitcoin@sitesoutheat[.]com 
beacon@msgsafe[.]io


briansalgado@protonmail[.]com
best666decoder@tutanota[.]com 


bugervongir@outlook[.]com
bitcoin@mobtouches[.]com 


best666decoder@protonmail[.]com 
encrypt2020@outlook[.]com 


decoder83540@cock[.]li
fast-help@inbox[.]lv


decra2019@gmail[.]com 
fuc_ktheworld1448@outlook[.]com


diniaminius@winrof[.]com 
fucktheworld1448@cock[.]li


dirhelp@keemail[.]me 
gartaganisstuffback@gmail[.]com 



 



Email Addresses




emaila.elaich@iav.ac[.]ma
gavingonzalez@protonmail[.]com


emd@jitjat[.]org
gsupp@onionmail[.]org


encrypt2020@cock[.]li 
gsupp@techmail[.]info


best666decoder@protonmail[.]com 
helper@atacdi[.]com 


ithelp@decorous[.]cyou
helper@buildingwin[.]com 


ithelp@decorous[.]cyoum
helprestore@outlook[.]com


ithelp@wholeness[.]business
helptorestore@outlook[.]com



 



TOR Addresses




http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/6-iSm1B1Ehljh8HYuXGym4Xyu1WdwsR2Av-6tXiw1BImsqoLh7pd207Rl6XYoln7sId 


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/8-grp514hncgblilsjtd32hg6jtbyhlocr5pqjswxfgf2oragnl3pqno6fkqcimqin


http://gvlay6y4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMETPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-XmBgZLWlm5ULGFCOJFuVdEymmxysofwu


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/2l-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHeOrxjtE9lck1MuXPYo29daQys6gomZZXUImN7Z 


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-DcaE9HeHywqSHvdcIwOndCS4PuWASX8g 


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-kB4rQXGKyxGiLyw7YDsMKSBjyfdwcyxo


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-bET6JbB9vEMZ7qYBPqUMCxOQExFx4iOi 


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5. onion/8-MO0Q7O97Hgxvm1YbD7OMnimImZJXEWaG-RbH4TvdwVTGQB3X6VOUOP3lgO6YOJEOW


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/8-gRp514hncgb1i1sjtD32hG6jTbUh1ocR-Uola2Fo30KTJvZX0otYZgTh5txmKwUNe 


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-E6UQFCEuCn4KvtAh4TonRTpyHqFo6F6L-OWQwD1w1Td7hY7IGUUjxmHMoFSQW6blg 


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-E6UQFCEuCn4KvtAh4TonRTpyHqFo6F6L-uGHwkkWCoUtBbZWN50sSS4Ds8RABkrKy 


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-E6UQFCEuCn4KvtAh4TonRTpyHqFo6F6L-Tj3PRnQlpHc9OftRVDGAWUulvE80yZbc 


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/8-Ww5sCBhsL8eM4PeAgsfgfa9lrqa81r31-tDQRZCAUe4164X532j9Ky16IBN9StWTH 


http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-wIq5kK9gGKiTmyups1U6fABj1VnXIYRB-I5xek6PG2EbWlPC7C1rXfsqJBlWlFFfY


qd7pcafncosqfqu3ha6fcx4h6sr7tzwagzpcdcnytiw3b6varaeqv5yd.onion


http://medusacegu2ufmc3kx2kkqicrlcxdettsjcenhjena6uannk5f4ffuyd.onion/leakdata/paigesmusic-leakdata-closed-part1



 
Disclaimer: Many of these observed IP addresses are several years old and have been historically linked to MedusaLocker ransomware. We recommend these IP addresses be investigated or vetted by organizations prior to taking action, such as blocking.



IP Address
Last Observed




195.123.246.138
Nov-2021


138.124.186.221
Nov-2021


159.223.0.9
Nov-2021


45.146.164.141
Nov-2021


185.220.101.35
Nov-2021


185.220.100.249
Sep-2021


50.80.219.149
Sep-2021


185.220.101.146
Sep-2021


185.220.101.252
Sep-2021


179.60.150.97
Sep-2021


84.38.189.52
Sep-2021


94.232.43.63
Jul-2021


108.11.30.103
Apr-2021


194.61.55.94
Apr-2021


198.50.233.202
Apr-2021


40.92.90.105
Jan-2021


188.68.216.23
Dec-2020


87.251.75.71
Dec-2020


196.240.57.20
Oct-2020


198.0.198.5
Aug-2020


194.5.220.122
Mar-2020


194.5.250.124
Mar-2020


194.5.220.124
Mar-2020


104.210.72.161
Nov-2019



 
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
MedusaLocker actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 1.
Table 1: MedusaLocker Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise



Initial Access




Technique Title
ID
Use


External Remote Services
T1133
MedusaLocker actors gained access to victim devices through vulnerable RDP configurations.


Phishing
T1566
MedusaLocker actors used phishing and spearphishing to obtain access to victims' networks.


Execution


Technique Title
ID
Use


Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

T1059.001

MedusaLocker actors may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution.


Defense Evasion


Technique Title
ID
Use


Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot

T1562.009

MedusaLocker actors may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services.


Impact


Technique Title
ID
Use


Data Encrypted for Impact
T1486
MedusaLocker actors encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.


Inhibit System Recovery
T1490
MedusaLocker actors may deny access to operating systems containing features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair.



 
Mitigations
Implement a recovery plan that maintains and retains multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, or the cloud).
Implement network segmentation and maintain offline backups of data to ensure limited interruption to the organization.
Regularly back up data and password protect backup copies stored offline. Ensure copies of critical data are not accessible for modification or deletion from the system where the data resides.
Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as possible.
Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege. 
Disable unused ports.
Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA).
Use National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies:
	
Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length.
Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.
Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials.
Avoid reusing passwords.
Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts.
Disable password “hints”.
Refrain from requiring password changes unless there is evidence of password compromise. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords and no longer require regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
Require administrator credentials to install software.


Only use secure networks; avoid using public Wi-Fi networks.
Consider installing and using a virtual private network (VPN) to establish secure remote connections.
Focus on cybersecurity awareness and training. Regularly provide users with training on information security principles and techniques as well as overall emerging cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities, such as ransomware and phishing scams.

 
Resources

Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide
No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment

Reporting

To report an incident and request technical assistance, contact CISA at cisaservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov or 888-282-0870, or FBI through a local field office. 
Financial Institutions must ensure compliance with any applicable Bank Secrecy Act requirements, including suspicious activity reporting obligations. Indicators of compromise (IOCs), such as suspicious email addresses, file names, hashes, domains, and IP addresses, can be provided under Item 44 of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) form. For more information on mandatory and voluntary reporting of cyber events via SARs, see FinCEN Advisory FIN-2016-A005, Advisory to Financial Institutions on Cyber-Events and Cyber-Enabled Crime, October 25, 2016; and FinCEN Advisory FIN-2021-A004, Advisory on Ransomware and the Use of the Financial System to Facilitate Ransom Payments, November 8, 2021, which updates FinCEN Advisory FIN-2020-A006.
The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information securely.

Contact InformationTo report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To report incidents and anomalous activity or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to this threat, contact CISA at report@cisa.gov.
Revisions
 June 30, 2022: Initial Version  

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa22-181a