Share: Email | Twitter

ID

VDE-2017-005

Published

2017-12-11 14:26 (CET)

Last update

2021-11-11 08:39 (CET)

Vendor(s)

Pepperl+Fuchs SE

Product(s)

Article No° Product Name Affected Version(s)
CK70A-ATEX <= current version
CK71A-ATEX <= current version
CN70A-ATEX <= current version
CN70E-ATEX <= current version
Ex-Handy 09 <= current version
Ex-Handy 209 <= current version
i.roc Ci70-Ex <= current version
Pad-Ex 01 <= current version
Smart-Ex 01 <= current version
Smart-Ex 201 <= current version
Tab-Ex 01 <= current version

Summary

Multiple security issues and vulnerabilities within the WPA2 standard have been identified and publicized by Mr. Mathy Vanhoef of KU Leuven. These vulnerabilities may allow the reinstallation of a pairwise transient key, a group key, or an integrity key on either a wireless client or a wireless access point (AP). In consequence, an attacker could establish a man-in-the-middle position between AP and client facilitating packet decryption and injection.

ecom instruments is a subsidiary company of PEPPERL+FUCHS.

Vulnerabilities



Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 9:59 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11r allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the fast BSS transmission (FT) handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 10 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peer Key (TPK) during the TDLS handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Last Update
Sept. 20, 2019, 9:42 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 9:58 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 9:59 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 10 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Last Update
Sept. 22, 2019, 10 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Last Update
Sept. 20, 2019, 9:42 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Last Update
Sept. 20, 2019, 9:43 a.m.
Weakness
7PK - Security Features (CWE-254)
Summary
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.

Impact

ecom instruments devices are in theory attackable by replay, decryption and forging of packets. However, to perform the attack, the attacker must be significantly closer to the ecom device than to the access point. The WPA2 password cannot be compromised using a KRACK attack. Note if WPA-TKIP is used instead of AES-CCMP, an attacker can easily forge and inject packets directly into the WLAN.

Solution

23.10.2018, Update A: Firmware for Android based devices now available 

Android

Affected Products: Tab-Ex 01, Ex-Handy 09, Ex-Handy 209, Smart-Ex 01, Smart-Ex 201

Pepperl+Fuchs has released firmware updates for the following products

Product

Date

Updatesource

Smart-Ex 01

Available since 09/2018

FOTA-Update

Smart-Ex 201

Available since 10/2018

FOTA-Update

 

Windows

Affected Products: Pad-Ex 01, i.roc Ci70-Ex, CK70A-ATEX, CK71A-ATEX, CN70A-ATEX, CN70E-ATEX

For ecom instruments devices running Windows, we recommend to apply the security update provided by Microsoft. If you are using WPA-TKIP in your WLAN, you should switch to AES-CCMP immediately.

Note

This advisory will be updated as further details and/or software updates become available.

Reported by

Mathy Vanhoef of imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven published this vulnerability on https://www.krackattacks.com.

PEPPERL+FUCHS reported this vulnerability to CERT@VDE.