The build settings of a PLCnext Engineer project (.pcwex) can be manipulated in a way that can result in the execution of remote code.
The attacker needs to get access to a PLCnext Engineer project to be able to manipulate files inside. Additionally, the files of the remote code need to be transferred to a location which can be accessed by the PC that runs PLCnext Engineer. When PLCnext Engineer runs a build process of the manipulated project the remote code can be executed.

For process data documentation purposes the laboratory washers, thermal disinfectors and washer-disinfectors can be integrated in a TCP/IP network by utilizing the affected communication module.

The communication module is separate from the actual device control and uses a chipset from Digi International.

The TCP / IP stack required for networking is implemented in this chipset with the help of a 3rd party library from Treck. External security researchers have identified several security holes in this library called Ripple20. The most critical vulnerability allows an external attacker to execute arbitrary code on the chip and thus also on the communication module.

The above named communication module can be integrated into the following laboratory washers, thermal disinfectors and washer- disinfectors:

  • PG 8581
  • PG 8582
  • PG 8583
  • PG 8583 CD
  • PG 8591
  • PG 8582 CD
  • PG 8592
  • PG 8593
  • PG 8562

Manipulated PC Worx projects could lead to a remote code execution due to insufficient input
data validation.

The attacker needs to get access to an original PC Worx project to be able to manipulate data
inside the project folder. After manipulation the attacker needs to exchange the original files by
the manipulated ones on the application programming workstation.


By Vendor




(Scoring for CVSS 2.0,3.0+3.1)
No CVE available
0.1 <= 3.9
4.0 <= 6.9
7.0 <= 8.9
9.0 <= 10.0